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DEVELOPMENT ACCOUNTING WITH INTERMEDIATE GOODS
JAN GROBOVSˇEK
Abstract. Do intermediate goods help explain relative and aggregate productivity dif-
ferences across countries? Three observations suggest they do: (i) intermediates are
relatively expensive in poor countries; (ii) goods industries demand intermediates more
intensively than service industries; (iii) goods industries are more prominent intermediate
suppliers in poor countries. I build a standard multi-sector growth model accommodat-
ing these features to show that ineﬃcient intermediate production strongly depresses
aggregate labor productivity and increases the price ratio of final goods to services. Ap-
plying the model to data, low and high income countries in fact reveal similar relative
eﬃciency levels between goods and services despite clear diﬀerences in relative sectoral
labor productivity. Moreover, the main empirical exercise suggests that poorer countries
are substantially less eﬃcient at producing intermediate relative to final goods and ser-
vices. Closing the cross-country eﬃciency gap in intermediate input production would
strongly narrow the aggregate labor productivity diﬀerence across countries as well as
turn final goods in poorer countries relatively cheap compared to services.
1. Introduction
The value of intermediate production as a ratio of total output in a typical economy
is about one half. Despite their quantitative importance, intermediate goods have so
far received little attention in development accounting. This should per se not be of
any concern if the eﬃciency of intermediate relative to final good production were not
systematically diﬀerent across countries and if the structure of input-output relations were
not asymmetric across broadly-defined industries. My concern in this paper is threefold.
First, I document that the above conditions for intermediate good-neutrality do not hold
in the data. Second, I develop a simple growth model featuring two industries and two
specializations (intermediate and final production) and use it to highlight some qualitative
comparative static results. Third, I use the model to back out eﬃciency levels across
countries to identify which industry-specializations pairs are particularly ineﬃcient in poor
countries. Importantly, this is done in a general equilibrium context in which intermediate
input production is endogenous.
Two observations are key for the paper’s motivation. First, diﬀerent broadly-defined
sectors have systematically distinct technological requirements as regards the demand for
intermediates and vary systematically in their importance as suppliers of intermediates.
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More to the point, when the economy is subdivided into goods and service industries, the
former consume more intermediate value per unit of output, roughly 0.6 versus 0.4. In
addition, goods represent a higher share in the composition of intermediate consumption
in poor versus rich countries. This issue has been, to the best of my knowledge, largely
overlooked in the recent literature on development accounting. It proves significant in
interaction with a second set of empirical regularities. Namely, that in both industries
the production of intermediates, relative to final goods, is relatively expensive in poor
countries. This fact motivates an additional dichotomy between producers specializing in
either final or intermediate production.
To measure sectoral eﬃciency levels across countries I fit the model to the data in two
distinct development accounting exercises.1 In the first exercise I use observations from
the Groningen Growth and Development Centre (GGDC) for a sample of middle and
high income countries in 1997 which features comparable intermediate and final (pro-
ducer) prices. Three results stand out. First, comparing the least productive quintile
of countries to the most productive quintile, the group of poor countries has an average
aggregate labor productivity of one third yet an average eﬃciency level across all sectors
of more than one half. Second, despite featuring relatively expensive final goods com-
pared to services, poorer countries are by and large no more ineﬃcient producing (final or
intermediate) goods than services, which I dub industry-neutral technical change. Third,
poorer countries appear particularly ineﬃcient at producing intermediate rather than final
goods and services, which is to say that technical change is not specialization-neutral.
Alternatively, I run a second exercise using data from the the World Input-Output
Database (WIOD) in conjunction with final price data from the International Compar-
ison Program (ICP) for 2005. This approach allows for a larger sample of more recent
observations. It has the drawback, however, of being mute on industry-level producer
prices which prevents a distinction between eﬃciency levels across specializations (i.e. in-
termediate versus final producers). The conclusion here is in line with the above findings.
First, while the least productive quintile of countries have an average aggregate labor
productivity of about one fifth compared to the richest quintile, their average eﬃciency
level across all sectors is almost one half. Second, whereas in poorer countries final goods
are expensive in relation to services, goods industries in these countries are not relatively
less eﬃcient than services industries (if anything it is the opposite).
The theoretical analysis of the model as well as counterfactual model-data specifica-
tions highlight the equilibrium outcomes. First, the inclusion of intermediate production
leverages production ineﬃciencies, which are compounded through the relative scarcity
of important production factors. This is all the more serious as poorer countries seem
to be particularly ineﬃcient producing intermediate rather than final goods. Second, as
goods industries rely more heavily on the availability of intermediate inputs than services
industries, less eﬃcient economies feature lower measured relative labor productivity in
(final as well as intermediate) goods versus services. This makes goods relatively expen-
sive in poor countries. Again, the apparent fact that poorer countries are particularly
ineﬃcient in the production of intermediate inputs reinforces that eﬀect. Third, while the
cross-country shift in the nominal composition of intermediate inputs between intermedi-
ate goods and services suggests a strong complementarity between the latter, this has a
negligible eﬀect on the inference of sectoral eﬃciency levels.
The crucial message is that the eﬃciency of intermediate input production is responsible
for a large part of the aggregate and relative sectoral labor productivity diﬀerences across
countries. A simple counterfactual exercise stresses the impact of intermediate inputs
in the accounting framework. If the poorest quintile of countries were somehow able
1The term eﬃciency is used henceforth to denote real multi-factor productivity.
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to adopt the average eﬃciency of intermediate good production of the richest quintile,
their aggregate labor productivity (compared to the richest countries) is predicted to
increase from about one third to two thirds (from about one fifth to more than half in the
alternative specification). Also, in both specifications such a move would imply a radical
shift in relative final prices - poor compared to rich countries would then feature relatively
expensive final services rather than goods.
This paper is closely related to the literature on sectoral development accounting.2
Based on final expenditure price data, Herrendorf and Valentinyi (2012) compute that
low-income countries are particularly unproductive at producing goods as compared to
services. This is in line with evidence from Bernard and Jones (1996a) who show that
during the 1970’s and 1980’s OECD countries have experienced income convergence in
services, but not in manufacturing.3 On the other hand, Duarte and Restuccia (2010)
present evidence, based on industry growth accounting and employment shares, that
poorer countries are particularly unproductive in the agricultural and service sectors,
but less so in manufacturing. My aim is to shed light on these conflicting pieces of
evidence by stressing the importance of input-output patterns in determining relative
sectoral productivities. Ngai and Samaniego (2009) similarly stress the importance of
the composition of intermediate goods for productivity inferences, though their focus is
on investment-specific technical change.4 In general, sectoral growth accounting analyses
across countries have been hampered by the availability of internationally comparable
industry price data. Exceptions that do use sectoral industry prices and explicitly account
for intermediate inputs include Jorgenson, Kuroda and Nishimizu (1987), Lee and Tang
(2000) and van Ark and Pilat (1993) for specific country comparisons as well as Inklaar
and Timmer (2007) for a larger set of countries. These studies diﬀer, however, from the
present paper in that intermediates inputs are exogenously retrieved from the data rather
than a general equilibrium outcome.
The literature oﬀers some support for the notion that the production of intermediate
goods is particularly ineﬃcient in poor countries. On the theoretical front, Acemoglu,
Antra`s and Helpman (2007) apply the incomplete contracts framework of Grossman and
Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990) to the analysis of contracts between producers
and their specialized input suppliers. They find that a higher degree of contract incom-
pleteness lowers the suppliers’ incentive to invest and hence leads to underprovision of
intermediate inputs. This fits well with empirical evidence provided by Nunn (2007) who
argues that countries with more eﬃcient contractual institutions tend to be richer and
specialize in the production of goods that require special relationships with suppliers. An
alternative reason for poor countries’ low performance in producing intermediates could
be a lower degree of competitive pressure. Amiti and Konings (2007) provide empirical
support that the lowering of trade barriers in developing countries boosts productivity by
increasing import competition in the market for intermediate goods. That foreign compet-
itive pressures strongly boost productivity in a prominent intermediate good producing
sector such as mining is also empirically documented in Galdo´n-Sa´nchez and Schmitz
(2002). In addition, international trade frictions may inhibit the transfer of technology
via the import of intermediate goods. In this sense Kasahara and Rodrigue (2008) and
2See Caselli (2005) for an overview and applications of development accounting.
3Related early literature on cross-country convergence at the aggregate economy level includes amongst
others Baumol (1986), Barro and Sala-i Mart´ın (1992), Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) and Bernard
and Jones (1996b). More recent articles on sectoral convergence using producer prices are Sørensen and
Schjerning (2008) and Inklaar and Timmer (2009).
4The classical theoretical contributions on growth accounting with intermediate goods include amongst
others Melvin (1969) and Hulten (1978).
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Halpern, Koren and Szeidl (2011) estimate that imported intermediates strongly boost
domestic firms’ productivity in Chile and Hungary, respectively. Similarly, Goldberg,
Khandelwal, Pavcnik and Topalova (2010) identify productivity gains from the import of
a larger variety of intermediates in India.5
As intermediates are essential factors of production, a strand of the literature has fo-
cused on their under-provision as a substantial barrier to development. Jones (2011)
shows theoretically how generic wedges that disperse the marginal productivity of inter-
mediate goods, coupled with these goods’ complementarity in production, substantially
lower aggregate productivity.6 His model builds on the seminal contribution of Mirrlees
(1971) on the negative welfare eﬀect of taxing intermediate inputs and the one of Kremer
(1993) on the multiplier eﬀect of complementarity in production. Ciccone (2002) is also
a theoretical treatment of the process of industrialization as the deepening of intermedi-
ate good use intensity, based on evidence to that eﬀect reported in Chenery, Robinson
and Syrquin (1986). Adamopoulos (2011) studies the impact of a crucial intermediate
input, transportation. He computes that poorer countries’ relative high transportation
costs strongly amplify their aggregate productivity gap. Similarly, Restuccia, Yang and
Zhu (2008), using producer price data of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO),
find that farms in poor countries face substantially higher relative prices for intermedi-
ate goods. This lowers their agricultural productivity, which in turn strongly diminishes
aggregate productivity as resources are channelled into agriculture due to the negative
income eﬀect. Their interest in (real) physical intermediate input intensity as opposed
to nominal intensity is very similar in spirit to Hsieh and Klenow (2007). They stress
that poorer countries have lower investment rates in physical capital when measured in
internationally comparable prices, but not in local prices. Here I highlight a similar phe-
nomenon by claiming that a portion of poor countries’ low productivity can be ‘explained’
by their low real investment rate in the intermediate production factor even when their
nominal investment rate is just as high as in rich countries.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the empirical evidence.
Section 3 proposes the model environment. The theoretical results of the model are sum-
marized in section 4. Section 5 presents the main empirical findings and their implications
while section 6 repeats that exercise using alternative data. Section 7 concludes.
2. Empirical motivation
2.1. Relative prices
One of the most salient stylized features in development accounting is that at the
level of final expenditure, goods (i.e. agricultural, industrial consumption and investment
goods) are relatively more expensive than services in poorer countries. Figure 1 plots
the relative price of final services to goods from the ICP 2005 round against GDP per
capita.7 These relative price diﬀerences are presumably informative about which are
the ‘problem sectors’ in poor countries if one is interested in growth accounting at the
final expenditure level. Herrendorf and Valentinyi (2012) use similar data to construct
production functions for diﬀerent sectors to back out sectoral TFP series. They find that
the poorest countries are particularly ineﬃcient at producing agricultural and investment
5In general, due to the rise of vertical specialization across countries intermediate inputs may have
become an important source the increase in international trade over the last couple of decades, a point
emphasized theoretically in Yi (2003).
6The dispersion of productivities within sectors as a source of large aggregate productivity diﬀerences
has recently received a lot of attention. See for instance Banerjee and Duflo (2005), Guner, Ventura and
Xu (2008), Restuccia and Rogerson (2008) and Hsieh and Klenow (2009).
7The construction of all the series in the following figures is described in the Appendix.
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goods, and also ineﬃcient at producing consumption goods, while being significantly less
ineﬃcient at producing services.
Figure 1. Price of final services relative to final goods
The drawback of such an approach is that it does not directly imply relative productiv-
ity diﬀerences at the industry level. This information, however, would be more valuable
for researchers trying to micro-found productivity diﬀerences across countries and sectors
that are related to ineﬃciencies at the level of the production unit. To circumvent this
problem as well as the unreliability of price measurements across countries, Duarte and
Restuccia (2010) use a structural transformation model to measure cross-country sectoral
productivity diﬀerences for OECD countries and a smaller sample of middle income coun-
tries. They infer level diﬀerences from relative industry employment shares at a given
moment in time and then use industry-based productivity growth data to measure pro-
ductivity growth and hence productivity levels through time. Interestingly, and in stark
contrast, they find that rich compared to poor countries have higher productivity levels
in the production of agricultural goods and services but a less pronounced productivity
advantage in manufacturing.
The diﬀerence in the two results may simply be due to the fact that Herrendorf and
Valentinyi (2012) measure TFP while Duarte and Restuccia (2010) infer labor productiv-
ity. Yet since the sectoral physical and human capital factor shares used by Herrendorf
and Valentinyi (2012) do not vary much between manufacturing and services, this seems
unlikely. Rather, the conflicting evidence calls for an analysis involving the input-output
process that translates production into final expenditure.
One indicator that intermediate goods play an essential role in development accounting
is the fact that they appear to be relatively expensive in poor countries. This observation
comes out of the only relatively large dataset on internationally comparable relative prices
at the industry level, provided by the GGDC in conjunction with EU KLEMS, covering
most OECD countries and several Central and Eastern European countries in the year
1997 (for further discussion see O’Mahony and Timmer (2009)). Figure 2 plots data for
each sample country on the price of intermediate goods (services) relative to the price
of final goods (services) against data on aggregate productivity per hour worked. The
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(a) Goods industry (b) Service industry
Figure 2. Price of intermediate goods (services) relative to final goods
(services)
downward-sloping shape of the series suggests that in both industries - goods and services -
intermediates are relatively expensive compared to final goods in lower income countries.8
2.2. Intermediate consumption and supply shares
Figure 3 summarizes the 2005 nominal intermediate consumption share (the value of
an industry’s intermediate consumption relative to output - the diﬀerence to one is the
industry’s value-added) across countries from internationally comparable input-output
tables compiled for the World Input-Output Database (WIOD), against GDP per hour.9
Two trends stand out. First, for both sectors the ratios seem rather uncorrelated with
GDP per capita.10 This fact has been previously pointed out elsewhere for the overall
intermediate consumption ratio in the economy (e.g. Jones (2011)). It runs counter, how-
ever, to the argument expressed in Chenery et al. (1986), according to which input-output
ratios tend to rise during industrialization, possibly due to the adoption of diﬀerent tech-
nological practices. In this paper I will abstract from arguments involving changes in
technology and treat the input-output ratio of an industry as depending exclusively on
a time-invariant factor share of inputs in the production function.11 Rather, I wish to
highlight the other feature that emerges from Figure 3, namely that industries vary sub-
stantially in their requirement of intermediate goods. The production of goods uses up
relatively larger values of intermediate goods than the production of services. While the
implication of diﬀerences in intermediate factor intensities across sectors on the analysis
8The sample includes 30 countries. The coeﬃcient of correlation (t-statistic) is -0.67 (-4.83) for goods
and -0.69 (-5.10) for services.
9This sample comprises 40 countries, including several low-income non-OECD countries such as India,
China and Indonesia. For further details on the construction of internationally comparable input-output
tables see Ahmad and Yamano (2006).
10The coeﬃcient of correlation (t-statistic) is 0.05 (0.32) for goods and 0.33 (2.14) for services. The
statistical significance for services is entirely driven by the outlier Luxembourg.
11The WIOD data, which start in 1995, suggest a slight secular shift towards an increase in factor
intensities. The average intermediate factor intensity in 1995 for the goods and service industries is 0.64
and 0.39, respectively. For 2005 the numbers are 0.67 and 0.42, respectively. On the other hand, data
for the US indicate remarkable stable factor intensities for manufacturing and services from 1960 until
today - see Moro (2012b).
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(a) Goods industry (b) Service industry
Figure 3. Nominal intermediate consumption intensity
of productivity has been known at least since Domar (1961) and Hulten (1978), it has re-
ceived little attention in the latest literature on aggregate productivity across countries.12
The stability of aggregate intermediate factor shares across countries and industries does
not, however, extend to the composition of intermediate consumption. Figure 4 shows
that in higher income countries, industries producing goods (services) tend to spend a
relatively less (more) on intermediates deriving from their own sector.13 In lower income
countries, goods industries therefore appear more prevalent as suppliers of intermediates
in nominal terms.
3. Economic environment
3.1. Model description
I consider a closed economy that is static so the firms’ and households’ objectives only
need to be specified over intratemporal choices.
3.1.1. Production
All firms operate in a competitive environment. They specialize in producing either
final or intermediate goods, indexed respectively by j ∈ {f,m}. At the final good level
there is a representative firm indexed by i ∈ {g, s} in each of the two industries - goods
and services.14 It produces according to the constant returns to scale production function
yfi = Afi
￿
γ
1
ρi
gi x
ρi−1
ρi
gfi + γ
1
ρi
si x
ρi−1
ρi
sfi
￿ σiρiρi−1
l1−σifi (1)
where yfi and lfi denote, respectively, firm fi’s output and labor input while xjfi is
the firm’s demand for the intermediate good supplied by industry j. Afi > 0 is the
firm’s eﬃciency parameter, σi ∈ (0, 1) the composite intermediate good factor share,
ρi ∈ [0, 1) ∪ (1,∞) the elasticity of substitution between the two intermediate inputs
12Diﬀerences in sectoral intermediate consumption shares have recently been exploited in the literature
on macroeconomic volatility. See for instance Moro (2012b), Carvalho and Gabaix (forthcoming).
13The coeﬃcient of correlation (t-statistic) is -0.73 (-7.05) for goods and 0.87 (10.67) for services.
14Goods will have as their empirical counterpart the industry labels A-F while services are comprised
of industries G-Q.
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(a) Goods industry (b) Service industry
Figure 4. Intermediate consumption composition
and γgi ∈ (0, 1) their relative weights in production, with
￿
j=s,g γji = 1. The firm’s
maximization of profits implies
max
xgfi≥0,xsfi≥0,lfi≥0
(pfiyfi − pmgxgfi − pmsxsfi − wlfi) (2)
where pfi is the price of the firm’s output, pmj the price of intermediate input j and w
the wage rate.
Analogously, intermediate goods producers in each industry i produce according to
ymi = Ami
￿
γ
1
ρi
gi x
ρi−1
ρi
gmi + γ
1
ρi
si x
ρi−1
ρi
smi
￿ σiρiρi−1
l1−σimi , (3)
with Ami > 0, and solve
max
xgmi≥0,xsmi≥0,lmi≥0
(pmiymi − pmgxgmi − pmsxsmi − wlmi) . (4)
Notice that the technical parameters σ, ρ and γ are assumed to vary across industries, but
not across specializations or across countries. In contrast, eﬃciency A is specific to both
industry and specialization and is thought of as the only variable that is country-specific.
Finally, market clearing implies that
ci = yfi, i ∈ {g, s} , (5)
xifg + xifs + ximg + xims = ymi, i ∈ {g, s} . (6)
where ci is consumption of final good i.
At this point several clarifications are necessary. First, the breakup into two industries is
not only driven by convenience and access to data. As argued in the previous section, there
are grounds to believe that along the dimensions of interest here - intermediate goods trade
and relative productivity - there is a clear-cut distinction between industries producing
goods and those producing services. A further separation of the goods industry into
consumption and investment goods would enrich the model by incorporating investment
behavior. Similarly, distinguishing agriculture from manufacturing would allow the model
to capture better the phenomenon of structural transformation. Yet both would come at
the price of less analytical tractability of the central issue here.15
15This also allows to compare results with the literature that explicitly microfounds relative sectoral
eﬃciency diﬀerences across countries, typically framed within two sectors. One example is Buera, Kaboski
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Second, the Cobb-Douglas specification between composite intermediate inputs and
labor can be defended empirically by the argument of stable intermediate factor shares
across countries as presented in Figure 3. The relative mix of industry-specific inter-
mediate goods, however, is allowed to vary systematically with relative price changes,
consistent with the discussed evidence in Figure 4.
Third, given the form of the production functions (1) and (3) I interpret A as factor-
neutral eﬃciency. In this I follow Jones (2011) or the multi-factor analysis in the EU
KLEMS data, which implicitly assumes that eﬃciency is embedded in intermediate goods
as well as in other production factors. This is opposed to the alternative specification
y =
￿
γ
1
ρ
g x
ρ−1
ρ
g + γ
1
ρ
s x
ρ−1
ρ
s
￿ σρρ−1
(Bl)1−σ where eﬃciency B = A1−σ is purely embedded in
labor.16 Independently of the specification, however, A is thought of as capturing both
actual (technical and organizational) eﬃciency as well as the use of additional production
factors such as physical and human capital that are not explicitly modelled here.
3.1.2. Households
A representative household solves the problem maxcg≥0,cs≥0 u(cg, cs) subject to
pfgcg + pfscs ≤ w (lfg + lfs + lmg + lms)
and
lfg + lfs + lmg + lms = 1. (7)
For the main accounting exercise it is not necessary to specify the utility function.
This only becomes necessary for computing counterfactuals as well as for the comparative
static analysis of welfare. In this case the specification will be
u(cg, cs) =
￿
ω
1
ρ
g c
ρ−1
ρ
g + ω
1
ρ
s c
ρ−1
ρ
s
￿ ρ
ρ−1
(8)
where ρ ∈ [0, 1) ∪ (1,∞) denotes the elasticity of substitution between the two final
consumption goods and ω ∈ (0, 1) their relative weights, with ￿i=s,g ωi = 1. This utility
function implies that sectoral structural transformation is driven by relative price changes
as proposed by Ngai and Pissarides (2007).17 A second issue to note is that calling c a
consumption good is a slight abuse of language. What is meant by c is actually more the
final use of the good, i.e. it can be used for investment as well as consumption. Also,
in view of the subsequent data analysis, note that in an open economy context c could
equally represent an export (whether in the form of a final or an intermediate good - the
crucial point is that it is not consumed as an intermediate in the home economy).
and Shin (2011) who show how financial frictions in poor countries disproportionately aﬀect the sector
of tradables (i.e. goods).
16Moro (2012a) is one exception in the literature to use the alternative specification by which technology
is not embedded in intermediate goods.
17Herrendorf, Rogerson and Valentinyi (forthcoming) analyze the relative merit of this specification
compared to one based on income eﬀects (as for instance in Kongsamut, Rebelo and Xie (2001)) in
accounting for secular changes in expenditure shares on agricultural, manufactured and service goods in
the US. They find that price eﬀects are not an important driver of changes in the final expenditure. I
nonetheless choose the above utility specification as it is more convenient to handle and because there is
a clear cross-country correlation between the relative final price of goods to services and final expenditure
shares. Herrendorf et al. (forthcoming) do not find such a correlation for the three expenditures items
that they consider.
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3.2. Equilibrium definition
The equilibrium is a list of production, yji, final consumption cj, intermediate input
demand for goods xgji and services xsji, labor allocation lji, prices pji, ∀j ∈ {f,m} , i ∈
{s, g}, as well as the wage rate w such that:
i) households take {pfi}i∈{s,g} and w as given and solve their problem;
ii) the representative final good producer in industry i ∈ {g, s} takes input prices
{pmi}i∈{s,g}, the wage w and output price pfi as given and solves (2);
iii) the representative intermediate good producer in industry i ∈ {g, s} takes prices
{pmi}i∈{s,g} and the wage w as given and solves (4);
iv) the goods markets clear so that (1), (3), (5) and (6) are satisfied ∀i ∈ {g, s};
4. Theoretical implications
Assuming an interior solution, the equilibrium leads to a straightforward characteriza-
tion, summarized in the Appendix. This subsection identifies the qualitative theoretical
general equilibrium eﬀect of movements in the eﬃciency parameters A on prices, interme-
diate input intensity and aggregate labor productivity. To highlight some of the eﬀects I
will consider some equilibrium outcomes under the following structural restriction.
Assumption 1. Eﬃciency levels are structurally linked according to :
Afs = A
φ
fg, Ams = A
φ
mg, Amg = A
µ
fg, (9)
with φ > 0 and µ > 0.
This assumption implies that the economy’s eﬃciency is suﬃciently characterized by
Afg and that φ captures diﬀerences in sectoral growth across industries (goods and ser-
vices) while µ captures diﬀerences in sectoral growth across specializations (final and
intermediate goods and services). When the assumption holds it is worthwhile to analyze
the following scenarios.
Definition 1. Industry-neutral technical change: φ = 1 so that dAfgAfg =
dAfs
Afs
and
dAmg
Amg
= dAmsAms .
Definition 2. Specialization-neutral technical change: µ = 1 so that dAfgAfg =
dAmg
Amg
and dAfsAfs =
dAms
Ams
.
Considering the equilibrium outcome under these restrictions is of interest as the data
analysis will show that depending on the data source, empirical estimates of µ > 1 and
φ ≈ 1 are reasonable if prices of intermediates inputs are available, while φ ≈ 1 appears
reasonable when these prices are not available (in which case µ = 1 by construction).
4.1. Prices
Combining (23) and (24) from the Appendix results in the following price ratio between
specializations:
pmi
pfi
=
Afi
Ami
, ∀i ∈ {s, g} . (10)
Since production functions across specializations are identically parametrized, the price
ratios between final and intermediate good suppliers in each industry is fully characterized
by their relative eﬃciency. Note that the downward sloping price ratios across special-
izations in Figure 2 suggest that poorer countries are relatively ineﬃcient at producing
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intermediate goods in both industries. The final good price ratio pfs/pfg is implicitly
pinned down by combining again (23) and (24):
pfs
pfg
=
(1− σg) σ
σg
1−σg
g
(1− σs) σ
σs
1−σs
s
AfgA
σg
1−σg
mg
AfsA
σs
1−σs
ms
￿
γss +
￿
Afs
Afg
Amg
Ams
pfs
pfg
￿ρs−1
γgs
￿ σs(1−σs)(1−ρs)
￿
γgg + γsg
￿
Afs
Afg
Amg
Ams
pfs
pfg
￿1−ρg￿ σg(1−σg)(1−ρg) . (11)
Because the two industries are cross-linked through trade in intermediate goods, the latter
is independent of the specification of the utility function and only reflects underlying
technological parameters. Combining (1) with (21) and (22) from the Appendix obtains
an expression for the relative labor productivity between final good producers:
yfg/lfg
yfs/lfs
=
1− σs
1− σg
pfs
pfg
(12)
Comparing relative final prices across rich (R) and poor (P ) countries therefore gives a
one-to-one mapping to relative productivities in final goods since
yPg /l
P
g
yPs /l
P
s
/
yRg /l
R
g
yRs /l
R
s
=
pPs /p
P
g
pRs /p
R
g
.
This is not to say, however, that this price ratio is also a relevant measure of relative
eﬃciencies across industries, as formalized in the following Proposition.
Proposition 1. Assume the economy experiences positive eﬃciency growth and that the
structural relationship (9) holds. (i) Under industry-neutral technical change the relative
price of final services to final goods pfs/pfg is increasing (decreasing) if and only if σg >
(<) σs; (ii) under specialization-neutral technical change pfs/pfg is increasing (decreasing)
if and only if φ < (>) 1−σs1−σg .
Proof. Appendix. ￿
The data presented in the previous section (Figure 3) indicate that goods industries
have a higher intermediate factor share than services (σg > σs). The stylized fact that
the relative value of pfs/pfg increases as a country catches up in development hence does
not imply that convergence is necessarily accompanied by higher growth in the goods
industry compared to services. Because the production of goods is more sensitive to the
cost of intermediates, (industry-neutral) increases in eﬃciency are likely to magnify the
labor productivity of the goods industry more than the one of the service industry.18 It
need not be therefore that poor countries are particularly ineﬃcient at producing goods.
The second part of Proposition 1 states that converging countries could indeed have
faster growth in services compared to goods and still experience an increase in the ratio
pfs/pfg as long
1−σs
1−σg > φ > 1, which is plausible. One implication of this is that even
if rich countries were actually relatively better at producing services than goods (as may
well have resulted from the analysis in Duarte and Restuccia (2010) if they had treated
agriculture and manufacturing as one industry), goods may still turn out to be relatively
cheaper in these countries due to the demand side of the input-output relationship. Not
taking this relationship into account by focusing only on final goods can lead to a biased
diagnostic of which industries are the ‘problem sectors’ of poor countries.
18This is analogous to international trade theories in the tradition of Hekscher and Ohlin where poor
countries are thought of as being relatively unproductive in producing goods with high capital intensity
and where capital endowments are fixed. Here intermediate inputs are not fixed, but their supply is
relatively less abundant than labor in poor countries because their aggregate production is lower.
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4.2. Intermediate good intensity
A common measure of interest in development accounting is the capital to output ratio.
In a similar vein it is of interest to identify the intermediate good to output ratio. For
this I define the composite intermediate input m demanded by specialized industry ji
as mji ≡
￿
γ
1
ρi
gi x
ρi−1
ρi
gji + γ
1
ρi
si x
ρi−1
ρi
sji
￿ ρiρi−1
and by ￿pji its associated price so that ￿pjimji =
pmgxgji + pmsxsji. From the Cobb-Douglas specification of the production function it is
clear that in equilibrium the value intensity of intermediates in production is￿pjimji
pjiyji
=
pmgxgji + pmsxsji
pjiyji
= σi, ∀j ∈ {f,m} , i ∈ {s, g} . (13)
By construction the intermediate consumption ratios in the two industries in nominal
terms are constant across countries, which mimics the evidence in Figure 3. What does
vary in value is the relative composition of the composite intermediate good. The combi-
nation of (10) with (21) and (22) obtains the relative share of the industries’ intermediates
that they derive from their own respective industry:
pmgxgjg
pmgxgjg + pmsxsjg
=
γgg
γgg + γsg
￿
pms
pmg
￿1−ρg , ∀j ∈ {f,m} (14)
≡ Ggg ∈ (0, 1)
and
pmsxsjs
pmgxgjs + pmsxsjs
=
γss
γss + γgs
￿
pms
pmg
￿ρs−1 , ∀j ∈ {f,m} (15)
≡ Gss ∈ (0, 1) .
The real intensity in the composite intermediate good, however, is expected to vary
across countries depending on the relative values of A as summarized in the following
Proposition. In particular, one may be interested in the real intermediate intensity of
final goods industries. These industries’ output equals total value-added and hence their
access to intermediate inputs is analogous to the availability of investment goods when
the production function is expressed in terms of value-added.
Proposition 2. Assume the economy experiences positive eﬃciency growth and that the
structural relationship (9) holds. (i) Under industry-neutral technical change the real in-
termediate input intensity mfg/yfg is increasing (decreasing) if and only if￿
1− (σg−σs)(1−Ggg)(1−σg)(1−σs)+σs(1−σg)(1−Gss)+σg(1−σs)(1−Ggg)
￿
µ > (<) 1, and mfs/yfs is increasing (de-
creasing) if and only if
￿
1 + (σg−σs)(1−Gss)(1−σg)(1−σs)+σg(1−σs)(1−Ggg)+σs(1−σg)(1−Gss)
￿
µ > (<) 1; (ii) un-
der specialization-neutral technical change mfg/yfg is decreasing (increasing) and mfs/yfs
is increasing (decreasing) if and only if φ < (>) 1−σs1−σg .
Proof. Appendix. ￿
Under industry-neutral technical change, for σg > σs it is expected that the real in-
termediate intensity of the final service industry increases as the economy grows. For
the final goods industry the sign is not clear. Notice however that for a large enough
µ > 1 (i.e. the technology in intermediate production grows suﬃciently faster than in
final production), intermediates are likely to become relatively cheap for the final goods
industry as well so that it increases its real intermediate use. This is reminiscent of Hsieh
and Klenow (2007) who show that poorer countries are likely to have a lower real capital
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intensity because they are relatively ineﬃcient at producing investment goods (as well as
tradable consumption goods).
On the other hand, for specialization-neutral technical change such that φ is close to 1
(i.e. in conjunction with approximate industry-neutral technical change) we can expect
economic growth to have the following eﬀect: goods industries are likely to decrease
while service industries are likely to increase their intensity in intermediate inputs. The
intuition for this is that technological growth tends to increase the relative price of (final
and intermediate) services compared to goods. Since the composite intermediate input is
a combination of goods and services, neutral technological growth renders intermediates
relatively cheap for service industries and relatively expensive for goods industries.
4.3. Aggregate productivity
Value-added in each specialized industry ji is defined as V Aji ≡ pjiyji−pmgxgji−pmsxsji.
Plugging the values for x from (21) and (22) into the expression for (1) results in V Aji =
(1− σi) pjiyji. Nominal GDP (per unit of labor) is defined as GDP ≡
￿
j,i V Aji. Let
the household’s utility follow the specification (8) so that P ≡ ￿ωgp1−ρfg + ωsp1−ρfs ￿ 11−ρ be
the ideal price deflator. As w = GDP , substituting (1) in (20) after plugging in (21) and
(22) obtains the indirect utility function, and hence the ideal real GDP measure in this
economy, as either one of two alternative expressions:
GDP
P
=
(1− σg) σ
σg
1−σg
g AfgA
σg
1−σg
mg
￿
γgg + γsg
￿
Afs
Afg
Amg
Ams
pfs
pfg
￿1−ρg￿ σg(ρg−1)(1−σg)
￿
ωg + ωs
￿
pfs
pfg
￿1−ρ￿ 11−ρ (16)
=
(1− σs) σ
σs
1−σs
s AfsA
σs
1−σs
ms
￿￿
Afs
Afg
Amg
Ams
pfs
pfg
￿ρs−1
γgs + γss
￿ σs(ρs−1)(1−σs)
￿
ωs + ωg
￿
pfs
pfg
￿ρ−1￿ 11−ρ .
The diﬀerentiation of any of these expressions allows to analyze the relative impact of
changes in eﬃciency levels on aggregate productivity. In particular, it is of interest to
note which changes have more of an impact in poor versus rich countries.
Proposition 3. Assume the economy experiences positive eﬃciency growth and that the
structural relationship (9) holds. (i) Under industry-neutral technical change real the-
oretical GDP increases by
￿
1 + σg(1−σs)(1−Os)+σs(1−σg)Os+σgσs(2−Ggg−Gss)(1−σg)(1−σs)+σg(1−σs)(1−Ggg)+σs(1−σg)(1−Gss)µ
￿
dAfg
Afg
, where
Os ≡ pfscspfgcg+pfscs =
ωs(pfs/pfg)
1−ρ
ωg+ωs(pfs/pfg)
1−ρ ∈ (0, 1); (ii) under specialization-neutral technical
change real theoretical GDP increases by (1−σs)(1−Os)+σs(1−Gss)+[(1−σg)Os+σg(1−Ggg)]φ(1−σg)(1−σs)+σg(1−σs)(1−Ggg)+σs(1−σg)(1−Gss)
dAfg
Afg
.
Proof. Appendix. ￿
Structural transformation implies that the expenditure share of services Os is increas-
ing with rising income levels. Also, the evidence in Figure 4 suggests that in poorer
countries a larger fraction of intermediate inputs used by the goods industry derives
from its own sector (relatively large Ggg) while the opposite is true for the service in-
dustry (relatively low Gss). Under industry-neutral technical change growth is expected
to be disproportionately beneficial for poorer countries. This is because they have a
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rather high value of σg (1− σs) (1−Os) + σs (1− σg)Os in the numerator (while the
value of 2 − Ggg − Gss is qualitatively indeterminate), and a relatively low value of
σg (1− σs) (1−Ggg) + σs (1− σg) (1−Gss) in the denominator. First, as goods indus-
tries are more intensive in intermediate inputs (σg (1− σs) > σs (1− σg)), poor countries
stand more to gain from higher eﬃciency in intermediate production as they spend a
larger fraction of final consumption on goods. Second, poor countries use a higher frac-
tion of goods in intermediate consumption while goods are more sensitive to changes in
the availability of intermediates as explained in Proposition 1. In addition, the total ben-
efit is more pronounced if the responsiveness of intermediate eﬃciency is strong (large µ).
Taken together, if industry-neutral technical change is a good feature of the data, there
is reason to believe that poor countries are more sensitive to changes in the eﬃciency
with which intermediates are produced. Put otherwise, ineﬃciencies in the production
of intermediate goods are likely to strongly decrease the GDP of poor countries due to
complementarities in technology and preferences.
Under specialization-neutral technical change, poor countries again benefit dispropor-
tionately more from aggregate productivity changes due their larger consumption of goods
intermediates (the denominator in the above expression). Apart from that, we also have
that a low responsiveness of the service industry eﬃciency (small φ) tends to have a
smaller impact in poorer countries since they have a lower exposure to the service indus-
try in terms of consumption and intermediate supply.
5. Accounting and counterfactuals
In this section I infer the county-specific implied eﬃciency levels A for the sample of
countries included in the GGDC/EU KLEMS 1997 benchmark study of cross-country
price levels and quantities at the industry level. I use this dataset because it is the only
one to my knowledge that provides comprehensive information on industry-based output
and prices across countries.19 Note that the construction of the model and the discussion
of the theoretical results so far involved arguments based on Figures 1, 3 and 4 that derive
from diﬀerent (and broader) data sources. The qualitative trends reported there are very
similar in the GGDC data.
5.1. Calibration
5.1.1. Procedure
The method to construct the relevant data series is described in the Appendix. The
calibration of the model proceeds in three steps. First, using first order conditions, I pin
down the technology-related parameters σg and σs directly and infer γgg and ρg as well
as γss and ρs from minimizing the discrepancy between the data and model predictions
across all countries in the sample. In the second step I back out the parameters Afg,
Afs, Amg and Ams for all countries from first order conditions. Third, to close the model
I infer the preference parameters ρ and ω from minimizing the discrepancy between the
data and model predictions. The resulting parameter values are reported in Table 1.
Matching the condition (13) for both sectors with the data on intermediate good shares
for all sample countries I compute average values of σg = 0.570 and σs = 0.358.
20 Using
19The methodology behind the dataset, in particular the derivation of industry and input prices, is
described in detail in Inklaar and Timmer (2008).
20These values are lower than the ones suggested by Figure 3. The reason for this is that the GGDC
data nets out intra-industry deliveries at the lowest level of aggregation (at 29 industries). For details
see Inklaar and Timmer (2008), p 22.
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γgg + γsg = 1 and γgs + γss = 1, the conditions (14) and (15) can be rewritten to give
log
￿
pmg (xgfg + xgmg)
pms (xsfg + xsmg)
￿k
= log
γgg
1− γgg
+
￿
ρg − 1
￿
log
￿
pms
pmg
￿k
+ εk (17)
and
log
￿
pms (xsfs + xsms)
pmg (xgfs + xgms)
￿k
= log
γss
1− γss
+ (1− ρs) log
￿
pms
pmg
￿k
+ εk (18)
for each country k ∈ {1, 2, ..., K} where εk is assumed to be white noise. Using data on
the observables on the left and right hand side the two separate OLS regression across
all countries deliver γgg = 0.675 and ρg = 0.191 as well as γss = 0.580 and ρs = 0.273.
Since both elasticities are less than unity, intermediate goods and intermediate services
are gross complements in the composite intermediate input of both industries.
With the parameter values in hand there are suﬃcient observables to infer the four
eﬃciency values A for each country from the model’s equilibrium conditions. The price
data (pmg/pfg)
k and (pms/pfs)
k are directly informative about country k’s relative eﬃ-
ciency levels across specializations from (10). Data on relative hours worked in the goods-
producing industry
(lfg+lmg)
k
(lfg+lmg+lfs+lms)
k are instructional about the relative productivity of
that industry.21 Aggregate productivity per hour worked Y k is informative about the
overall eﬃciency level. I choose to set the data measure of country k’s real GDP per hour
worked Y k equal to yfg+(pfs/pfg)
US yfs so that the model’s product is evaluated in terms
of the US relative final price ratio (which is furthermore normalized to 1, as in the data).22
Finally, a fifth identifying equation is needed to close the equilibrium. One could simply
use the first order condition of the household. However, as countries diﬀer significantly in
terms of their final consumption patterns this method appears to lack robustness. Since
the object of inquiry here is aggregate productivity I prefer to use data on relative final
prices across countries (pfs/pfg)
k. The resulting solution consists of the four eﬃciency
levels A and as a by-product also includes all other equilibrium outcomes.
parameter value target
σg 0.570
￿
k
￿
pmg(xgfg+xsmg)+pms(xsfg+xgmg)
pfgyfg+pmgymg
￿k
/K
σs 0.358
￿
k
￿
pmg(xgfs+xgms)+pms(xsfs+xgms)
pfsyfs+pmsyms
￿k
/K
γgg, ρg 0.675, 0.191
pmg(xgfg+xgmg)
pms(xsfg+xsmg)
, pmspmg
γss, ρs 0.580, 0.273
pms(xsfs+xsms)
pmg(xgfs+xgms)
, pmspmg
ωg, ρ 0.246, 0.754
pfgcg
pfscs
, pfspfg
Table 1. Benchmark calibration
21Note that more specific measures about hours worked across diﬀerent specializations would be an
ideal target yet are not available since industries are not partitioned according to specialization in the
data.
22In the data, aggregate productivity across countries is evaluated in international prices. Using US
prices, however, is a good first order approximation of international prices. This is because the country
weight used for the construction of international prices is nominal GDP and therefore prices of large and
rich countries (especially the US) are disproportionately represented.
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(a) Share of goods
in value added
(b) Share of goods
in total output
(c) Total share of
intermediates
Figure 5. Model outcome versus data
In addition, I pin down the utility parameters for the purpose of performing counterfac-
tual exercises. Each country’s household condition (25) can be rewritten to the identifying
equation
log
￿
pfgcg
pfscs
￿k
= log
ωg
1− ωg + (ρ− 1) log
￿
pfs
pfg
￿k
+ εk. (19)
where εpk is assumed to be white noise. I construct the left-hand side of the equation
using data on pfgcfgpfscfs and perform an OLS regression to obtain values ωg and ρ that best
match the household’s first order condition with the data.23 There is less than unitary
substitutability between final goods, which is consistent with structural transformation
as a result of faster labor productivity growth in the final goods industry.
5.1.2. Model-data match
The identifying structure imposed on the model targets country-specific relative prices
and hours worked as well as the average input-output pattern (via the calibration). It
hence does not target each country’s sectoral allocation. Figure 5 reports the model’s
deviation from the data for each country in three variables of interest: the value-added
share of goods-producing industries, the gross output share of goods-producing industries,
and the aggregate share of intermediate consumption in gross output. A perfect match
would be such that all the countries lie on the 45 degree line.
The model does reasonably well in matching the data on all three dimensions, with
with few significant departures. The first two panels indicate that targeting hours worked
in the goods industry also successfully reproduces the strong diﬀerences across countries
in the relative nominal share of goods industries in production.
5.2. Results
Figure 6 presents the inferred eﬃciency levels. Each series is normalized so that the US
level equals 1 and is plotted against data on the countries’ aggregate hourly productivity.
Several things stand out. First, and not surprisingly, high-income countries tend to be
more eﬃcient in all specialization-industry pairs. Second, in both specializations, the
relationship between eﬃciency and aggregate productivity appears to be rather similar
for goods and services. The more pronounced diﬀerence is across specializations: com-
pared to poor countries, rich countries tend to be particularly more eﬃcient at producing
intermediate goods.
23GGDC does not provide data for final expenditure. For this I use data from the WIOD for the year
1997.
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Figure 6. Implied eﬃciency levels
The first column of Table 2 gives an alternative organization of these data. It com-
pares the mean eﬃciency for each category between the bottom and top quintile sample
countries in terms of aggregate productivity.24 Note that the eﬃciency gap between the
least and most productive countries in the production of final goods, at about 30-40%,
is significantly lower than in the production of intermediates at roughly 55%. Also, the
lowest income countries seem particularly ineﬃcient in the production of services rather
than goods.
Formally, the structural relationship posited in (9) can be tested. First, industry-
neutrality in the form of Afs = A
φ
fg and Ams = A
φ
mg is evaluated separately by the
following regressions for j = f,m:
log
￿
Ajs
Ajg
￿k
= α1j + β1j logA
k
jg + εk.
The corresponding estimates (t-statistics) are ￿β1f = −0.214 (−1.084) and ￿β1m = −0.084
(−0.844). Since ￿φ = 1+ ￿β1 and both values for ￿β1 are close to zero as well as statistically
insignificant at standard thresholds it is reasonable to conclude that ￿φ ≈ 1. Hence, while
the poorest countries do seem to be particularly ineﬃcient in producing goods, for the
overall sample relative eﬃciency across industries is pretty similar across countries of
diﬀerent income levels and we have industry-neutrality.
Similarly, the test for specialization-neutrality in the form of Amg = A
µ
fg and Ams = A
µ
fs
is given by the following regressions for i = g, s:
log
￿
Ami
Afi
￿k
= α2i + β2i logA
k
fi + εk.
The corresponding estimates (t-statistics) are ￿β2g = 0.396 (2.004) and ￿β2s = 0.457 (2.661).
Since ￿µ = 1 + ￿β2 and both values for ￿β1 are statistically significant it is reasonable to
conclude that ￿µ lies in the range between 1.4 and 1.45. This points to the fact that as
24The most productive countries in the sample (from top down) are: Luxembourg, Belgium, Canada,
the US, the Netherlands and Germany. The least productive are (from bottom up) Lithuania, Estonia,
Latvia, the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovenia.
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countries catch up in income they become relatively more eﬃcient in producing interme-
diate rather than final goods and services.
5.3. Counterfactuals
5.3.1. Counterfactual calibration
The foremost interest in the development accounting framework proposed in the present
paper is the recognition that (i) the production of final and intermediate goods commands
diﬀerent eﬃciency levels across countries, that (ii) goods and services diﬀer in their in-
tensity of intermediate input use as well as in (iii) their prominence as suppliers of inter-
mediates. Columns two through four of Table 2 present the eﬀect of closing down any of
these variations one at a time by comparing again the resulting technology levels between
the bottom and top productive countries.
The eﬃciency levels inferred in the second column result from repeating the original cal-
ibration but ignoring equation (10) and setting Akmg = A
k
fg and A
k
ms = A
k
fs, ∀k. Compared
to the benchmark, the eﬃciency gap between lower and higher income countries in final
goods production significantly increases while the one in intermediate goods production
decreases. Clearly, not accounting for poorer countries’ ineﬃciency at producing interme-
diates overstates the overall eﬃciency gap between poor and rich countries to mimic their
aggregate productivity diﬀerences and exaggerates in particular the gap between goods
and services to mimic the price ratio diﬀerences in final goods. Note as well that the
relative eﬃciency across sectors in poor countries now does not diﬀer greatly from rich
countries.
benchmark Akmg = A
k
fg, σg = σs = 0.451 γgg = 0.720, γss = 0.573,
Akms = A
k
fs ρg = ρs → 1
APfg/A
R
fg 0.723 0.575 0.593 0.727
APfs/A
R
fs 0.619 0.539 0.701 0.621
APmg/A
R
mg 0.469 0.575 0.386 0.471
APms/A
R
ms 0.445 0.539 0.503 0.446
Table 2. Counterfactual calibration
The third column reports the results from repeating the calibration exercise but setting
σg = σs = 0.451, i.e. to the average aggregate intermediate share across countries.
Ignoring diﬀerences in the demand intensity of goods versus service industries overturns
the implied relative eﬃciency across industries in poor countries. As supported by the
theoretical section, poor countries now appear significantly less productive in producing
goods than services, reflecting their final price ratio.
Finally, the last column presents the results from the calibration that sets ρg = ρs → 1
to switch oﬀ the variation in the nominal composition of intermediates across countries.
At the same time the share parameters γgg and γss are set to average composition values
across countries (0.720 and 0.573, respectively). Compared to the benchmark, there is
no notable eﬀect on the implied cross-country eﬃciency diﬀerences across sectors. This
suggests that ignoring cross-country diﬀerences in the composition of intermediates may
be of second-order importance to our exercise.
5.3.2. Convergence scenarios
We next turn to the question of how aggregate and relative productivity react to changes
in eﬃciency levels. Table 3 presents equilibrium outcomes from endowing the lowest in-
come quintile countries with the average eﬃciency level of the richest quintile countries
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in various sectors at a time while keeping other technology levels at the calibrated bench-
mark. This requires to close the equilibrium. For this I use the parametrized utility
function and the resulting first order condition of the household, which captures a new
equilibrium allocation of labor. Two statistics are of interest - the average relative final
price ratio of the low-income vis-a`-vis the high income group (0.824 in the data) and the
average aggregate productivity (0.332 in the data). All eﬃciency levels of the rich group
are kept constant as in the benchmark. Note the general equilibrium specification at base-
line eﬃciency levels exactly reproduces the relative final price data since these are pinned
down directly by the eﬃciency levels. It does not, however, exactly reproduce the level
of GDP since labor allocations diﬀer somewhat. Since the deviations are not substantial,
there is hope that the the counterfactual equilibrium outcomes can be compared to the
data.
In the initial scenario, poor countries are endowed with rich countries’ eﬃciency in pro-
ducing goods. This has a strong impact on the relative labor productivity of final goods
versus services in poor countries. The increase in aggregate productivity, however, is not
very large. This is partly due to the fact that the parametrized utility function underes-
timates the consumption share of final goods in the poorest country and by extension the
amount of hours worked in the goods industry. An increase in the eﬃciency of producing
goods hence does not have quite such a strong repercussion on these countries’ aggregate
productivity.25 The opposite is true in the second scenario where low income countries are
endowed with better technology in the service industry. In this case the model predicts
an enormous aggregate productivity gain.
(pfs/pfg)
P
(pfs/pfg)
R
Y P
Y R
data 0.824 0.332
baseline 0.824 0.348
Akfg = A
R
fg, A
k
mg = A
R
mg 1.504 0.507
Akfs = A
R
fs, A
k
ms = A
R
ms 0.513 0.630
Akfg = A
R
fg, A
k
fs = A
R
fs 0.692 0.542
Akmg = A
R
mg, A
k
ms = A
R
ms 1.175 0.642
Table 3. Convergence scenarios
Looking across specializations, note that an increase in the eﬃciency of final producers
tends to make final services relatively cheaper. This is related to the fact that final
services are relatively more sensitive to the eﬃciency in final rather than intermediate
production. Ultimately, the largest aggregate productivity increases are to be expected
from poor countries catching up in the production of intermediates. This is related both
to the fact that their relative eﬃciency in this sector is low as well as to the multiplier
eﬀect created by higher eﬃciency in the production of intermediate inputs. Such a move
also overturns the relative cost of final goods - final services are now relatively expensive
in poor countries.
6. Alternative accounting exercise
The above results hinge strongly on the identification of price ratios between intermedi-
ate and final goods from the GGDC dataset. It may be of concern that the low eﬃciency
25In the data the average share of hours worked in the goods industry in the six least productive
countries is 0.47. At the calibrated eﬃciency levels and using the parametrized utility function this
fraction decreases to 0.32.
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level of the intermediate sector identified in lower income countries is due to mismeasure-
ment, the choice of data aggregation and/or outliers in the given benchmark year. Also,
the sample in the GGDC dataset only includes 30 countries, of which only a handful are
middle-income and of which most share a common planned-economy history. In light of
these drawbacks I present another quantification based on WIOD data in conjunction
with final price data from the World Bank’s ICP. The sample now includes more recent
data (for 2005) and comprises a larger number of countries (forty). More importantly,
there is a larger variation of countries in terms of their income per hour.
6.1. Calibration
The calibration follows the same procedure as the one in the previous section. The only
diﬀerence is that the present dataset does not identify the relative price of intermediates
versus final goods. As an alternative I use the identifying assumption pmgpfg = 1 and
pms
pfs
= 1.
This implies that pmspmg =
pfs
pfg
in equations (17) and (18). It also implies Afg = Amg and
Afs = Ams. The estimated parameters from the regressions (17), (18) and (19) all indicate
negative elasticities of substitution, namely ρg = −0.165, ρs = −0.932 and ρ = −0.481.
Since negative elasticities are diﬃcult to interpret economically I choose to set them to
low positive values (ρg = ρs = ρ = 0.05) and recompute the corresponding weights γgg,
γss and ωg. The resulting parameters are summarized in Table 4.
parameter value target
σg 0.669
￿
k
￿
pmg(xgfg+xsmg)+pms(xsfg+xgmg)
pfgyfg+pmgymg
￿k
/K
σs 0.418
￿
k
￿
pmg(xgfs+xgms)+pms(xsfs+xgms)
pfsyfs+pmsyms
￿k
/K
γgg, ρg 0.657, 0.05
pmg(xgfg+xgmg)
pms(xsfg+xsmg)
, pmspmg
γss, ρs 0.744, 0.05
pms(xsfs+xsms)
pmg(xgfs+xgms)
, pmspmg
ωg, ρ 0.342, 0.05
￿
pfgcg
pfscs
￿k
,
￿
pfs
pfg
￿k
Table 4. Alternative benchmark calibration
Note that the nominal share of intermediates for both industries is now substantially
higher as the WIOD does not net out intra-industry deliveries.
6.2. Results
Figure 7 presents the inferred eﬃciency levels where each series is normalized to the
US and plotted against data on aggregate hourly productivity. Visually it is diﬃcult
to discern any particular diﬀerence in the relative eﬃciency between goods and services
across countries of diﬀerent income levels.
As before, we can compare the mean eﬃciency of the bottom versus the top quintile
sample countries in terms of aggregate productivity, reported in the first column of Table
5.26 The group of poor countries is a bit less than half as eﬃcient as the group of rich
countries, and it seems to be slightly less productive in the production of services vis-a`-vis
goods.
26The most productive countries in the sample (from top down) are: Luxembourg, Belgium, the Nether-
lands, France, the US, Germany, Australia and Ireland. The least productive are (from bottom up) India,
China, Indonesia, Brazil, Romania, Mexico, Bulgaria and Russia.
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Figure 7. Alternative implied eﬃciency levels
Again, we can test the structural relationship posited in (9). Note that here we already
assume by construction specialization-neutrality (µ = 1). Industry-neutrality in the form
of Afs = Ams = A
φ
fg = A
φ
mg, on the other hand, is evaluated by the following regression:
log
￿
Afs
Afg
￿k
= α1 + β1 logA
k
fg + εk.
The corresponding estimate (t-statistic) is ￿β1 = 0.087 (0.974). Since ￿φ = 1+ ￿β1 and ￿β1 is
statistically insignificant at standard thresholds one can reasonably conclude that ￿φ ≈ 1.
It appears that while the poorest countries have a somewhat lower relative eﬃciency in
services, across the whole sample the relative labor productivity between industries is
pretty similar across countries. This confirms the findings from the previous section, in
particular in the case where specialization-neutrality is imposed (second column of Table
2).
6.3. Counterfactuals
6.3.1. Counterfactual calibration
How sensitive are these eﬃciency levels with respect to the structure of the input-output
relations? The second column of Table 5 reports the implied mean eﬃciency level of the
lowest quintile group when abstracting from diﬀerences in intermediate intensity across
industries, i.e. when σg = σs = 0.532, the average aggregate intermediate share across
the sample. Conforming to the results in the previous section, poor countries now appear
relatively ineﬃcient in the production of goods so as to match the fact that these are
relatively expensive in poorer countries.
benchmark σg = σs = 0.532 γgg = 0.712, γss = 0.733, ρg = ρs → 1
APfg/A
R
fg 0.492 0.373 0.500
APfs/A
R
fs 0.445 0.513 0.452
Table 5. Alternative counterfactual calibration
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In addition, the third column reports the counterfactual calibration employing a unitary
elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods and services, with the corresponding
weights set to match the average composition of intermediates across countries. Compared
to the benchmark, note that ignoring the strong complementarity between intermediate
goods and services does not have strong repercussions other than accentuating somewhat
the low relative ineﬃciency of poor countries in the production of services.
6.3.2. Convergence scenarios
Ultimately, Table 6 reports equilibrium outcomes from endowing the lowest income
quintile countries with the average eﬃciency level of the richest quintile countries. It
is noteworthy that poorer countries again seem to have more to gain from catching up
in the eﬃciency of service-production rather than goods-production. Most importantly,
however, we see that low-income countries are expected to experience the highest increases
in GDP from converging to rich-country levels in intermediate production eﬃciency. The
diﬀerence in the GDP gain compared to the convergence in final goods is due solely to
the input-output pattern and the relatively high factor share of intermediate inputs. It
is not due to poorer countries having lower eﬃciency in intermediate input production
since here we imposed specialization-neutrality in the benchmark calibration. Besides,
it is interesting to observe that endowing poorer countries with rich-country levels in
intermediate production eﬃciency also makes poorer countries feature higher rather than
lower relative labor productivity in final goods versus services.
(pfs/pfg)
P
(pfs/pfg)
R
Y P
Y R
data 0.665 0.180
baseline 0.665 0.219
Akfg = A
R
fg = A
k
mg = A
R
mg 2.240 0.391
Akfs = A
R
fs = A
k
ms = A
R
ms 0.274 0.440
Akfg = A
R
fg, A
k
fs = A
R
fs 0.584 0.483
Akmg = A
R
mg, A
k
ms = A
R
ms 1.165 0.544
Table 6. Alternative convergence scenarios
7. Concluding remarks
This paper identifies that the main driving factor behind aggregate and sectoral relative
labor productivity diﬀerences across countries is the eﬃciency of intermediate good pro-
duction. The technical structure of the input-output relationship is such that relatively
minor ineﬃciencies in intermediate good production are magnified strongly. The natural
question to ask is, why exactly are some countries so ineﬃcient at producing these goods?
The theory presented by Acemoglu et al. (2007) on contractual diﬃculties with specialized
input suppliers may oﬀer an important ingredient. Other theories may center on the inef-
ficient involvement of government in either the procurement of intermediate goods or the
procurement of infrastructure that is particularly crucial for smooth trade in intermediate
inputs. Yet another theory may focus on low levels of competition for specialized inputs,
especially when countries suﬀer from natural or artificial barriers to international trade.
There is interest in directing future research in combining the leverage eﬀects discussed
in this paper with an explicit theory of eﬃciency in intermediate input production.
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8. Appendix
8.1. Data
8.1.1. Figures
Figure 1. Figure 1 is based on the World Bank’s International Comparisons Program
2005 benchmark data.27 The sample includes 142 countries for which all relevant data are
available. I first construct separate aggregate price levels for goods and services and then
compute the ratio of the two. Price levels are given by the entries Price level index (indi-
cator code PX.WL). Goods include Food and non-alcoholic beverages (1101), Alcoholic
beverages and tobacco (1102), Clothing and footwear (1103), Housing, water, electricity,
gas and other fuels (1104), Furnishings, household equipment and household maintenance
(1105) as well as Gross capital formation (15). Services includes Health (1106), Trans-
port (1107), Communication (1108), Recreation and culture (1109), Education (1110),
Restaurants and hotels (1111) as well as Collective consumption expenditure by Govern-
ment (14). Miscellaneous goods and services (1112) are omitted. The constructed series
are geometric means with weights based on the expenditure shares (indicator code CD) of
the sub-sectors. GDP per capita is computed by dividing Expenditures in international
dollars (indicator code PP.CD) by the total population (indicator code POP).
Figure 2. Figure 2 computes relative prices from the GGDC Productivity Level Database
for the benchmark year 1997.28 Note that both series are ratios between intermediate and
final goods prices. The series for intermediate good prices is based on the intermediate
input price deflator, PPP IIS for services and the weighted average between the price
of energy inputs (PPP IIE) and material inputs (PPP IIM) for goods. Each series is
a geometric mean over all the two-digit sub-sectors in the dataset, the weights being
the supply shares (IIS and IIE+IIM, respectively) to each sub-sector. The intermediate
input price pm is hence simply the mean over the prices that all the sub-sectors l in the
economy (pertaining both to goods G and service S industries) spend on that particular
intermediate input.
pms =
￿
l∈G,S
PPP IIS
IISl￿
l∈G,S IISl
l ,
pmg =
￿
l∈G,S
￿
PPP IIE
IIEl￿
l∈G,S(IIEl+IIMl)
l × PPP IIM
IIMl￿
l∈G,S(IIEl+IIMl)
l
￿
.
Next, the series for the final price is computed via the construction of the aggregate
output price po, based on the output deflator (PPP SO). The output price for goods and
services is a geometric mean of the sub-sectors where the weights are expenditures shares
(SO).
pos =
￿
l∈S
PPP SO
SOl￿
l∈S SOl
l ,
pog =
￿
l∈G
PPP SO
SOl￿
l∈G SOl
l .
The sub-sectors comprising goods are: Electrical and optical equipment (30t33), Food
products, beverages and tobacco (15t16), Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear
(17t19), Manufacturing nec; recycling (36t37), Wood and products of wood and cork (20),
Pulp, paper, paper products, printing and publishing (21t22), Coke, refined petroleum
27The data are available at http://databank.worldbank.org/ddp/home.do?Step=2&id=4&hActive Di-
mensionId=ICP 4 Series
28The data are available at http://www.ggdc.nl/databases/levels/2008/data/benchmark 1997.xls
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products and nuclear fuel (23), Chemicals and chemical products (24), Rubber and plas-
tics products (25), Other non-metallic mineral products (26), Basic metals and fabricated
metal products (27t28), Machinery, nec (29), Transport equipment (34t35), Mining and
quarrying (C), Electricity, gas and water supply (E), Construction (F), Agriculture, hunt-
ing, forestry and fishing (AtB). The sub-sectors comprising services are: Post and telecom-
munications (64), Trade (G), Transport and storage (60t63), Financial intermediation (J),
Renting of m&eq and other business activities (71t74), Hotels and restaurants (H), Other
community, social and personal services (O), Private households with employed persons
(P), Public admin and defence; compulsory social security (L), Education (M), Health
and social work (N), Real estate activities (70).
From here, I compute the final price pf assuming that the output price is approximated
by the geometric mean between the final and intermediate price. The weight of the
intermediate price is simply the value of aggregate intermediate consumption on the good
or service (the aggregate value of IIS and IIE+IIM, respectively) as a share of aggregate
output (SO). The final price is hence implicitly defined from
pos = p
￿
l∈G,S IISl￿
l∈S SOl
ms × p
￿
l∈S SOl−
￿
l∈G,S IISl￿
l∈S SOl
ms ,
pog = p
￿
l∈G,S(IIEl+IIMl)￿
l∈G SOl
mg × p
￿
l∈G SOl−
￿
l∈G,S(IIEl+IIMl)￿
l∈G SOl
mg ,
This allows for the construction of pmgpfg and
pms
pfs
, both of which are normalized to 1 for
the US. Finally, aggregate productivity in the data equals the ratio between value added
of total industries VA (TOT) and total hours worked HOURS (TOT), divided by the
total industry value added deflator PPP VA (TOT).
Figures 3 and 4. The intermediate consumption data underlying Figures 3 and 4 are
obtained from the WIOD National Input-Output tables and National Supply and Use
tables.29 The intermediate consumption share for goods (respectively, services) of Figure
3 is constructed as follows. The numerator aggregates intermediate consumption from
the use table at basic prices (USE bas) as well as net taxes (NetTaxes) from all suppliers
(1-95) for industries AtB through to F (34t35 through to FISIM for services). This sum
is divided by the total of gross output (USE bas, line GO) of categories AtB through to
F (34t35 through to FISIM for services).
The share of goods (service) intermediates in total intermediate consumption of the
goods (service) industry in Figure 4 is constructed similarly. The numerator consists of
the sum of intermediate consumption from the use table at basic prices (USE bas) as
well as net taxes (NetTaxes) from suppliers 1-45 (50-95 for services) for industries AtB
through to F (34t35 through to FISIM for services). This sum is divided by the series of
total intermediate consumption (for the respective industry) as described above.
Aggregate productivity is obtained from two data sources. The numerator consists of
GDP in international dollars from the Total Economy Database of The Conference Board,
series EKS GDP.30 Total hours worked are obtained from the WIOD Socio-Economic
Accounts.31 The series used is Total hours worked by persons engaged (H EMP, TOT).
8.1.2. Calibration
Main accounting exercise. Practically all the series are based on the GGDC Productivity
Level Database. For the construction of intermediate to final price ratios pmgpfg and
pms
pfs
as well as aggregate productivity Y , please refer to the above description of the data
29The data are available at http://www.wiod.org/database/nat suts.htm
30The data are available at http://www.conference-board.org/data/economydatabase/
31The data are available at http://www.wiod.org/database/sea.htm
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underlying Figure 2. The final price ratio between services and goods pfspfg - normalized
to 1 for the US - is constructed as explained above. Note that the definition of the sub-
sectors composing the goods and the service industry, respectively, is of course identical
to the one used in the construction of prices.
The series lfg+lmglfg+lmg+lfs+lms is constructed by adding hours worked in all sub-sectors per-
taining to goods and dividing by total hours worked. The industry-specific intermediate
consumption shares are constructed as
pmg (xgfg + xsmg) + pms (xsfg + xgmg)
pfgyfg + pmgymg
=
￿
l∈G (IISl + IIEl + IIMl)￿
l∈G SOl
,
pmg (xgfs + xgms) + pms (xsfs + xgms)
pfsyfs + pmsyms
=
￿
l∈S (IISl + IIEl + IIMl)￿
l∈S SOl
,
The composition of intermediates used by the goods and service industries, respectively,
is given by
pmg (xgfg + xgmg)
pms (xsfg + xsmg)
=
￿
l∈G (IIEl + IIMl)￿
l∈G IISl
,
pms (xsfs + xsms)
pmg (xgfs + xgms)
=
￿
l∈S IISl￿
l∈S (IIEl + IIMl)
.
Finally, the construction of the final expenditure ratio pfgcgpfscs is constructed for the year
1997 from the WIOD data, as described in the following subsection.
Additional accounting exercise. The construction of the final price ratio is explained in the
description of Figure 1. The series for intermediate consumption ratios and compositions
as well as aggregate productivity are explained in the description of Figures 3 and 4. Hours
worked in the goods industry is obtained from the WIOD Socio-Economic Accounts. I
sum the series Total hours worked by persons engaged (H EMP), entries AtB through to
F, and divide by the sum of total industries (TOT).
Finally, the ratio pfgcgpfscs is obtained from the WIOD Input Output tables as well. The
numerator (denominator) consists of the sum over Final consumption on Expenditure
(CONS), Gross Capital Formation (GCF) and Exports (EXP) of the use table at ba-
sic prices (USE bas) as well as net taxes (NetTaxes) from suppliers 1-45 (50-95 for the
denominator).
8.2. Computations
8.2.1. Solution of the theoretical model
The firms’ first order conditions with respect to lji in (2) and (4) give
w
pji
lji
yji
= 1− σi, ∀j ∈ {f,m} , i ∈ {s, g} . (20)
The first order conditions with respect to xgji and xsji are
pmg
pji
= Ajiσi
￿
γ
1
ρi
gi x
ρi−1
ρi
gji + γ
1
ρi
si x
ρi−1
ρi
sji
￿ 1−(1−σi)ρiρi−1
γ
1
ρi
gi x
−1
ρi
gji l
1−σi
ji , ∀j ∈ {f,m} , i ∈ {s, g} ,
pms
pji
= Ajiσi
￿
γ
1
ρi
gi x
ρi−1
ρi
gji + γ
1
ρi
si x
ρi−1
ρi
sji
￿ 1−(1−σi)ρiρi−1
γ
1
ρi
si x
−1
ρi
sji l
1−σi
ji , ∀j ∈ {f,m} , i ∈ {s, g} ,
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which can be rewritten to, ∀j ∈ {f,m} , i ∈ {s, g},
xgji =
￿
pji
pmg
Ajiσi
￿ 1
1−σi
￿
γgi + γsi
￿
pms
pmg
￿1−ρi￿ (1−σi)ρi−1(1−ρi)(1−σi)
γgilji, (21)
xsji =
￿
pji
pms
Ajiσi
￿ 1
1−σi
￿
γsi + γgi
￿
pms
pmg
￿ρi−1￿ (1−σi)ρi−1(1−ρi)(1−σi)
γsilji. (22)
Combining these two equations with (20) and (1) gives, ∀i ∈ {s, g},
w
pig
=
￿
pig
pmg
￿ σg
1−σg
A
1
1−σg
ig σ
σg
1−σg
g (1− σg)
￿
γgg + γsg
￿
pms
pmg
￿1−ρg￿ σg(1−σg)(ρg−1)
(23)
w
pis
=
￿
pis
pms
￿ σs
1−σs
A
1
1−σs
is σ
σs
1−σs
s (1− σs)
￿
γss + γgs
￿
pms
pmg
￿ρs−1￿ σs(1−σs)(ρs−1)
(24)
The household’s maximization problem implies:
pfs
pfg
=
ucs
ucg
=
￿
ωs
ωg
cg
cs
￿ 1
ρ
. (25)
These last five formulations, coupled with the clearing conditions (1), ∀i ∈ {g, s}, (3),
(5), (6) and (7) fully characterize the equilibrium, leaving room for the normalization of
one price.
8.2.2. Proof of Proposition 1
From (11) we have
ln
pfs
pfg
= lnAfg − lnAfs + σg
1− σg lnAmg −
σs
1− σs lnAms
+
σg￿
ρg − 1
￿
(1− σg) ln
￿
γgg + γsg
￿
Afs
Afg
Amg
Ams
pfs
pfg
￿1−ρg￿
− σs
(ρs − 1) (1− σs)
ln
￿￿
Afs
Afg
Amg
Ams
pfs
pfg
￿ρs−1
γgs + γss
￿
.
Diﬀerentiation gives
d (pfs/pfg)
pfs/pfg
= Λ
￿
1 +
σg
1− σg (1−Ggg) +
σs
1− σs (1−Gss)
￿
dAfg
Afg
(26)
−Λ
￿
1 +
σg
1− σg (1−Ggg) +
σs
1− σs (1−Gss)
￿
dAfs
Afs
+Λ
￿
σg
1− σg −
σg
1− σg (1−Ggg)−
σs
1− σs (1−Gss)
￿
dAmg
Amg
−Λ
￿
σs
1− σs −
σg
1− σg (1−Ggg)−
σs
1− σs (1−Gss)
￿
dAms
Ams
where
Ggg ≡
γgg
γgg + γsg
￿
Afs
Afg
Amg
Ams
pfs
pfg
￿1−ρg ∈ (0, 1) ,
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Gss ≡ γss
γss + γgs
￿
Afs
Afg
Amg
Ams
pfs
pfg
￿ρs−1 ∈ (0, 1) ,
Λ ≡
￿
1 +
σg
1− σg (1−Ggg) +
σs
1− σs (1−Gss)
￿−1
∈ (0, 1) .
Industry-neutral technical change (φ = 1) gives
d(pfs/pfg)
pfs/pfg
dAfg
Afg
=
(σg − σs)µ
(1− σg) (1− σs) + σg (1− σs) (1−Ggg) + σs (1− σg) (1−Gss) ,
while specialization-neutral technical change (µ = 1) gives:
d(pfs/pfg)
pfs/pfg
dAfg
Afg
=
(1− σs)− (1− σg)φ
(1− σg) (1− σs) + σg (1− σs) (1−Ggg) + σs (1− σg) (1−Gss)
8.2.3. Proof of Proposition 2:
From the definition mji ≡
￿
γ
1
ρi
gi x
ρi−1
ρi
gji + γ
1
ρi
si x
ρi−1
ρi
sji
￿ ρiρi−1
and (1) and (3) results that
mfg
yfg
= σg
Amg
Afg
￿
γgg + γsg
￿
Afs
Afg
Amg
Ams
pfs
pfg
￿1−ρg￿ 1ρg−1
,
mfs
yfs
= σs
Ams
Afs
￿
γss + γgs
￿
Afs
Afg
Amg
Ams
pfs
pfg
￿ρs−1￿ 1ρs−1
.
Diﬀerentiation and replacing
d(pfs/pfg)
pfs/pfg
by (26) obtains
d (mfg/yfg)
mfg/yfg
= Ggg
dAmg
Amg
−Ggg dAfg
Afg
− (1−Ggg)
￿
dAfs
Afs
− dAms
Ams
￿
−Λ (1−Ggg)

￿
1 + σg1−σg (1−Ggg) + σs1−σs (1−Gss)
￿
dAfg
Afg
−
￿
1 + σg1−σg (1−Ggg) + σs1−σs (1−Gss)
￿
dAfs
Afs
+
￿
σg
1−σg −
σg
1−σg (1−Ggg)− σs1−σs (1−Gss)
￿
dAmg
Amg
−
￿
σs
1−σs −
σg
1−σg (1−Ggg)− σs1−σs (1−Gss)
￿
dAms
Ams
 ,
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d (mfs/yfs)
mfs/yfs
= Gss
dAms
Ams
−GssdAfs
Afs
− (1−Gss)
￿
dAfg
Afg
− dAmg
Amg
￿
+Λ (1−Gss)

￿
1 + σg1−σg (1−Ggg) + σs1−σs (1−Gss)
￿
dAfg
Afg
−
￿
1 + σg1−σg (1−Ggg) + σs1−σs (1−Gss)
￿
dAfs
Afs
+
￿
σg
1−σg −
σg
1−σg (1−Ggg)− σs1−σs (1−Gss)
￿
dAmg
Amg
−
￿
σs
1−σs −
σg
1−σg (1−Ggg)− σs1−σs (1−Gss)
￿
dAms
Ams
 .
Industry-neutral growth (φ = 1) delivers:
d(mfg/yfg)
mfg/yfg
dAf
Af
=
(1− σg) (1− σs) + σs (1− σg) (1−Gss) + σs (1− σg) (1−Ggg)
(1− σg) (1− σs) + σs (1− σg) (1−Gss) + σg (1− σs) (1−Ggg)µ− 1,
d(mfs/yfs)
mfs/yfs
dAf
Af
=
(1− σg) (1− σs) + σg (1− σs) (1−Ggg) + σg (1− σs) (1−Gss)
(1− σg) (1− σs) + σg (1− σs) (1−Ggg) + σs (1− σg) (1−Gss)µ− 1.
while specialization-neutral growth (µ = 1) is given by:
d(mfg/yfg)
mfg/yfg
dAfg
Afg
=
(1−Ggg) [(1− σg)φ− (1− σs)]
(1− σg) (1− σs) + σg (1− σs) (1−Ggg) + σs (1− σg) (1−Gss) ,
d(mfs/yfs)
mfs/yfs
dAfg
Afg
=
(1−Gss) [(1− σs)− (1− σg)φ]
(1− σg) (1− σs) + σg (1− σs) (1−Ggg) + σs (1− σg) (1−Gss) .
8.2.4. Proof of Proposition 3:
Taking logs of (16), diﬀerentiating and replacing
d(pfs/pfg)
pfs/pfg
by (26) gives
d (GDP/P )
GDP/P
=
￿
1 +
σg
1− σg (1−Ggg)
￿
dAfg
Afg
+
￿
σg
1− σg −
σg
1− σg (1−Ggg)
￿
dAmg
Amg
− σg
1− σg (1−Ggg)
￿
dAfs
Afs
− dAms
Ams
￿
−Λ
￿
σg
1− σg (1−Ggg) +Os
￿
×

￿
1 + σg1−σg (1−Ggg) + σs1−σs (1−Gss)
￿
dAfg
Afg
−
￿
1 + σg1−σg (1−Ggg) + σs1−σs (1−Gss)
￿
dAfs
Afs
+
￿
σg
1−σg −
σg
1−σg (1−Ggg)− σs1−σs (1−Gss)
￿
dAmg
Amg
−
￿
σs
1−σs −
σg
1−σg (1−Ggg)− σs1−σs (1−Gss)
￿
dAms
Ams
 .
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where Os ≡
ωs
￿
pfs
pfg
￿1−ρ
ωg+ωs
￿
pfs
pfg
￿1−ρ . Industry-neutral technical change (φ = 1) gives:
d(GDP/P )
GDP/P
dAfg
Afg
= 1 +
σg (1− σs) (1−Os) + σs (1− σg)Os + σgσs (2−Ggg −Gss)
(1− σg) (1− σs) + σg (1− σs) (1−Ggg) + σs (1− σg) (1−Gss)µ,
while specialization-neutral technical change (µ = 1) gives:
d(GDP/P )
GDP/P
dAfg
Afg
=
(1− σs) (1−Os) + σs (1−Gss) + [(1− σg)Os + σg (1−Ggg)]φ
(1− σg) (1− σs) + σg (1− σs) (1−Ggg) + σs (1− σg) (1−Gss) .
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